Territorial government reforms at the time of financial crisis: the dawn of metropolitan cities in Italy by Longo, Erik & Mobilio, G.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=frfs20
Download by: [Universita Studi di Bologna] Date: 23 November 2017, At: 13:16
Regional & Federal Studies
ISSN: 1359-7566 (Print) 1743-9434 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/frfs20
Territorial government reforms at the time of
financial crisis: the dawn of metropolitan cities in
Italy
Erik Longo & Giuseppe Mobilio
To cite this article: Erik Longo & Giuseppe Mobilio (2016) Territorial government reforms at the
time of financial crisis: the dawn of metropolitan cities in Italy, Regional & Federal Studies, 26:4,
509-530, DOI: 10.1080/13597566.2016.1210603
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2016.1210603
Published online: 29 Jul 2016.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 129
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Territorial government reforms at the time of
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ABSTRACT
On 1 January 2015 a new institution, the metropolitan city, took its place among
the Italian territorial authorities. Despite its incorporation in the Italian
Constitution since 2001, the metropolitan city become a reality only when the
national government carried out a process of reform and transformation of
Italian territorial government by transforming 10 large cities into metropolitan
cities and depriving other intermediate governments (regions and provinces)
of their fundamental competences. This article critically reviews the activation
of metropolitan cities and the reshuffle of Italian territorial authorities. It
stresses the way in which this reform marks the shift towards a new phase of
Italian regionalism, which is dominated both by a dynamic of recentralizing
intergovernmental relations and by the resulting loss for provincial and
regional governments.
KEYWORDS Metropolitan cities; territorial government; regionalism; intermediate local authorities;
Italian Constitutional Court
1. Introduction
The struggle between localism and centralism is a key factor in understanding
Italy’s history; it is also a good framework for the analysis of contemporary
Italian institutions. Attempts to reorganize Italian localism have a long
history. After the unification in 1860, the king of Italy introduced a strong
central government and created a well-established network of decentralized
ministerial bodies (Prefetture) devoted to the control of cities and territories
(Putnam et al., 1994). This system was characterized by the simultaneous pres-
ence, at the territorial level, of both state bodies and local authorities (Comune
and Provincia) operating in the same fields; however, the latter were not
granted the power of self-governance (Castelli, 2013). In 1948 the Republican
Constitution established a clear separation from any previous system, by
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introducing the principle of the recognition and promotion of territorial gov-
ernment among the fundamental tenets of the new constitutional order, at
the same time establishing respect for the principle of decentralization on
the part of the state (Article 5). The Constitution defined the shape of what
we now call a ‘multi-level polity’ with two intermediate institutions between
local and state levels: provinces and regions.
Today, more than 150 years after unification, and with local authorities
having different constitutional status, the enactment of a new state law on ter-
ritorial government represents an issue that Italians must handle with care.
Indeed, new rules on territorial autonomies introduce conflicts not only
among cities, but also between each local authority and the central state.
The latest example of reform intended to herald a significant shift in the
regulation of Italian local government is Law No. 56 of 2014, also known as
‘Legge Delrio’ (hereinafter the Delrio Act, after the name of the Undersecretary
of State to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers that promoted the bill),
which was passed by the Italian parliament in April 2014. The Delrio Act con-
tains a general reform of provinces and municipalities, in each aspect of their
organization and powers, and innovatively introduces ‘metropolitan cities’ as
a new tier of government, as we will elucidate in this article.
The enactment of the Delrio Act marks the culmination of a controversial
political campaign and much-debated passage of the bill through parliament.
The whole story of this reform began with the political and economic crisis
that struck the Eurozone in 2008 and reached its peak in Italy during 2011.
The crisis brought to light the need to reform and shrink territorial govern-
ment in order to cut state budgets and implement the European policy of aus-
terity (Groppi et al., 2013).
Parliament came to grips with these issues with the Delrio Act and adopted a
more comprehensive plan to overhaul the intermediate local authorities. The
new act focuses on two main points. First, it transforms the territories of the
10 most important provinces of the country (Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin,
Genoa, Bologna, Florence, Venice, Bari and Reggio Calabria) into metropolitan
cities with special powers. Second, it reforms all the remaining provinces by
reducing the representativeness of their councils and by depriving them of
many functions. All these aspects will be explored further in the article.
In March 2015, ruling on a controversy between state and regions on the
above-mentioned rules, the Italian Constitutional Court upheld the Delrio Act
(decision No. 50 of 2015). The Court ruled as groundless the various objections
raised by four regions challenging the provisions regarding the powers and
elections of provinces and metropolitan cities. The decision was certainly one
of the most significant judgements on local government in Italy, as it substan-
tially endorsed the reform of second-tier authorities (Salerno and Fabrizzi, 2014).
In light of these developments, the purpose of this article is to contribute to
the European debate on intermediate local authorities by discussing the
510 E. LONGO AND G. MOBILIO
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
 St
ud
i d
i B
olo
gn
a] 
at 
13
:16
 23
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
introduction of metropolitan cities in Italy. We wonder if and how the intro-
duction of these new institutions will be capable of leading Italian decentra-
lization towards a new and as yet undiscovered phase.
Our discussion starts with an overview of the reform and provides a synop-
sis of the Delrio Act; next we analyse the Italian attempts to make institutional
reforms of local institutions over the last 20 years in order to understand the
path and reasons for the recent reforms. We then consider the so-called Euro-
pean dimension of metropolitan cities as a new phase in Italian decentraliza-
tion. Our discussion culminates in the understanding of the judgement of the
Italian Constitutional Court on metropolitan cities.
2. The activation of metropolitan cities
The Delrio Act lacks the formal attributes of a statute. Due to the controversial
situation during the approval of the bill, parliament chose a particular tech-
nique in its drafting of this law, which is composed of only one article and
151 paragraphs. Consequently, the text is very strange and all but incoherent.
This is because it lacks the usual canonical features of a statute, which is made
up of sections, articles and then paragraphs.
Even if it is not organized into homogeneous parts, the law can be divided
into two main sections. The first (paragraphs 5 to 50) concerns the organiz-
ation, competences and other rules regarding metropolitan cities, while the
second (paragraphs 51 to 156) contains rules governing other local auth-
orities, namely provinces, unifications (unioni di comuni) and mergers of muni-
cipalities ( fusion di comuni). The essential idea is that, with this novel system,
local authorities will be organized according to the principles of ‘subsidiarity’,
‘differentiation’ and ‘suitability’, as set out in Article 1, paragraph 1, of the law,
as well as in Article 118 of the Constitution. According to these three prin-
ciples, the local authority which is entrusted with an administrative function
should be the one closest to the citizens, and only if it does not have the struc-
ture to carry out the service should the function be attributed to a higher ter-
ritorial level (subsidiarity); the distribution must bear in mind the factual reality
of territorial institutions and distinguish between institutions according to
their capacity of government (differentiation); an organization should be
suited to ensuring the effective exercise of the competence (suitability).
The first part of the Delrio Act defines the organization, competences and
principles guiding the activity of metropolitan cities. According to the law,
from 1 January 2015, the territories of the provinces of Rome, Milan, Naples,
Turin, Genoa, Bologna, Florence, Venice and Bari were transformed into
metropolitan cities. By May 2016, all the metropolitan cities considered by
the Delrio Act had been instituted, except Reggio Calabria.
The Delrio Act strictly defines the number of metropolitan cities. Therefore,
only the law has the power to institute a new metropolitan city, with a
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corresponding parliamentary change to the Delrio Act. For this reason, the
state has been accused of having a centralistic approach, also because local
populations or municipalities cannot exercise the right of initiative to create
a new metropolitan city.
Regarding the identification of metropolitan cities, the legislature seems to
have followed an arbitrary criterion of choice, without referring to clear spatial
or demographic parameters. The selection has also been criticized as unrea-
sonable, since each area is very different, either in dimension, population or
economic productivity (Salerno, 2014).
As a consequence, the metropolitan city absorbs all the municipalities, as
well as the territories, of the former provinces. Therefore, the Delrio Act tight-
ens the borders of new metropolitan cities, impeding the easy change of the
perimeter created by the law. The impracticality of an easy way to change
their boundaries is considered a real obstacle for the promotion of local devel-
opment and flexibility of the new institution. It would have been better for the
legislature to modify the territory of metropolitan cities in accordance with the
socio-economic features of territories—which are now different from a
century ago when the provinces were instituted.
According to paragraph 44 of the law, the metropolitan cities retain all the
fundamental powers that the Italian Constitution and legislation used to yield
to the provinces, i.e. powers concerning the so-called wide-area (agriculture,
environment, maintenance of school facilities, tourism, etc.). Innovatively,
the Delrio Act sets out a list of six new competences:
. the adoption of a three-year strategic plan for the metropolitan territory;
. general urban planning;
. coordination and network of public services;
. local infrastructures;
. economic and social development; and
. promotion and coordination of Information and Communications Technol-
ogy (ICT) infrastructures.
The government has tried to correct this centralistic approach by granting
metropolitan cities a certain margin of autonomy. Each metropolitan city has
the power to adopt the Charter of Autonomy (Statuto di autonomia) and the
possibility of integrating the rules of the Delrio Act regarding the organization
of the new authority, the governance, the competences of the organs and
relations with the other municipalities of the area.
Moreover, the Delrio Act introduces important changes to governance
arrangements for intermediate local government in Italy. Each metropolitan
city has a mayor (sindaco), a council (consiglio) and a committee (conferenza),
all tagged with the adjective ‘metropolitan’.
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The mayor of the metropolitan city is by law the mayor of the biggest city in
that territory (e.g. the ‘mayor of Florence’ is also the ‘metropolitan mayor of
Florence’). The mayor has extensive powers, which are defined both in the
Delrio Act and in every Charter of Autonomy—e.g. the duty to represent
the metropolitan city and to control the administration.
The council has both the power to define the strategy of the metropolitan
city and to prepare the Charter of Autonomy. The number of councillors varies
according to the population of each metropolitan city (from 24 for the most-
populated to 14 for the least-populated). Councillors are not directly elected
by residents in the territory of the metropolitan city; they are elected from
among the mayors and members of the local councils.
Exceptionally the Delrio Act allows the Charter of Autonomy to opt for the
direct election of the metropolitan mayor and council by residents. This possi-
bility produces heavy consequences for the metropolitan city, like the duty of
carving up the metropolitan territory into multiple boroughs with a wide
margin of autonomy. Only the Charters of Autonomy of Milan, Rome and
Naples opted for this kind of election.
The committee is a residual board carrying out some of the functions once
wielded by the provincial council—e.g. the capacity to adopt the Charter of
Autonomy and to express guidelines to the benefit of the metropolitan
council and mayor. For this reason, the committee is considerably weaker
and carries little weight in the metropolitan structure of government.
Members of the committee are automatically the mayors of each municipality
in the territory of the metropolitan city.
The Delrio Act lays down a new regulation for all the other provinces that
are not transformed in metropolitan cities. According to the law, metropolitan
cities and all the other provinces have similarities, but also many differences.
As regards the similarities, the provinces have their own Charter of Autonomy
for integrating the rules of the Delrio Act. They also have a council (consiglio
provinciale), a president (presidente di provincia) and an assembly (assemblea
dei sindaci). The provincial councils are not elected from among the residents,
but from among mayors and municipal councillors, as is the case with the
metropolitan councils. The president of the province, unlike those of metropo-
litan cities, is a mayor of a municipality inside the province, freely elected by
mayors and municipal councillors (paragraphs 58–60). The assemblies are
composed of all mayors of the municipalities in the territory of the province,
as are the metropolitan committees.
On the other hand, the provinces lose many of the competences they had
in the past, and so differ from metropolitan cities, which gain many functions.
In fact, the competences covered by the provinces now include only urban
coordination, transport and maintenance of schools. All the other functions
that the provinces exercised in the past are to be transferred by central gov-
ernment and regions to the metropolitan cities, but also to the municipalities
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and only if required to ensure unitary practice to the regions, pursuant to the
principle of ‘subsidiarity’, ‘differentiation’ and ‘suitability’.
3. The long journey of metropolitan cities in Italy
As in 1990 and 2000, the Delrio Act provided parliament with a simplification
of the intergovernmental system through the abolition, merger and inte-
gration of territorial authorities into new larger institutions. The expected
outcome of this reform is not just a reduction and better coordination of
local and intermediate government, but also a way of implementing the
new dogmas of European integration, namely development from the
bottom, simplification, innovation and a reduction in public expenditure
(Loughlin, 2000).
Thus, the Delrio Act represents a significant reshuffling in the Italian levels
of government. Since the Constitution of 1948, there have been four levels of
government in Italy: national, regional, provincial and municipal (Baccetti,
2011). The Italian Republic operates within a system of unitary sovereignty ,
in which the regions are political entities created to devolve a part of the leg-
islative power to a level closer to the population. In addition, territorial auth-
orities are considered independent of each other, but all are dependent on
the national government that has the power to direct and control affairs, to
allocate budget and designate responsibility. In brief Italy’s subnational
levels consisted of 15 ordinary regions (Regioni a statuto ordinario), 5
regions with special status (Regioni a statuto speciale), 110 provinces (Province)
and over 8000 municipalities (Comuni). Provinces form the intermediate level
of local government, and, with the municipalities, they constitute the territor-
ial government system. Provinces are administrative units with different
demographic and territorial profiles. They present a highly fragmented
picture, marked by the tendency to be very small.
While the importance and necessity of having strong territorial govern-
ment has been the aim of every Italian government since the Second World
War, the implementation of the regions in 1970, with the first election of
regional councillors, questioned the role of the provinces (Evans and Rizzi,
1978). As a result, they suffered political decline between the 1960s and the
1980s, squeezed between the increasing role of regions and the importance
of municipalities.
It was not until the 1990s, when the political system found itself in a deep
crisis, that parliament passed a series of laws devoted to beginning a process
of reorganization and devolution of powers to intermediate and local levels. In
this phase, the reappraisal of the role of the provinces was conducted in a
threefold manner. Firstly, they were granted new general competences in
some fields (agriculture, roads, school facilities, tourism, etc.). Secondly,
central government introduced the direct election of mayors and provincial
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presidents in order to enhance local government stability, efficiency and per-
formance (Rolla, 1992; Spence, 1993; Magre and Bertrana, 2007). Thirdly, inno-
vations and modernization occurred in administration and self-regulation at
the intermediate and local level. Laws separated and distinguished between
powers of bureaucracy and politicians, recognized statutory autonomy, and
transformed territorial administration according to the principles of transpar-
ency, accountability and efficiency (Mattarella, 2010).
As often occurred in the past, the starting point of Italian reforms coincided
with a moment of radical international changes. Italy’s loss of economic com-
petitiveness and the 1992–1993 crisis (when Italy, Spain and theUK abandoned
the European Monetary System), as well as the birth of the Maastricht system
and the resulting changes in the economic policies of the European states
(Dyson and Featherstone, 1999), pushed governments to propose measures
to cut ‘red tape’ together with a strong reform of political processes.
Likewise, in the course of the political and institutional crisis of the early
1990s, local levels were able to anticipate certain trends in the rest of the insti-
tutional system. Their ability to change was a consistent consequence of the
law that provided for the direct election of mayors in two rounds of voting—a
system in which only the first two candidates proceeded to the second ballot,
the winning coalition being rewarded with a ‘bonus’ (Dente, 1997).
At such a critical point, Europe, local levels and civil society were assumed
to be a ‘sound part’ of a new course for Italian democracy (Lippi, 2011). The
request for a reduction of the general government debt, the good results of
the election law reform, the crisis of old political parties and the consequences
of these issues for the transformation of political parties persuaded the
decision-makers to increase the devolution of powers, favouring a brisk, yet
gradual, decentralization (Bull and Rhodes, 1997). In this way, the decentrali-
zation programme totally reflected the political climate: an entirely different
approach from the traditionally institutional arrangements of the Western
world (mainly the transformation of the ‘Napoleonic’ arrangements of the
Italian administration).
As in other European countries during the last part of the twentieth
century, the revival of the decentralization process brought a reshaping of
the relationship between the state and local government, establishing a
new organization and framework of competences. During that period, Italy
witnessed important institutional reforms granting more powers to regional
governments. Thus, Italy started a quasi-federalist programme, which led it
to becoming a strongly regionalized and would-be federal nation (Caretti
and Tarli Barbieri, 2007).
At the beginning of the 2000s, Italy reformed Title V of the Constitution
devoted to the regions, provinces and municipalities. Even the constitutional
reform of the Italian unitary state was the outcome of a fortunate combination
of a threefold pressure, one from above (Europe), another from below (local
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levels) and another from civil society (Fabbrini and Brunazzo, 2003). The reform
introduced several important transformations into the architecture of regional
and local levels in the Constitution. Article 114 of the Constitution now lists the
entities that compose the Republic, starting from the level closest to citizens, i.e.
the municipality. The level between municipalities and regions includes, along
with provinces, also metropolitan cities. Therefore, the metropolitan cities
share with provinces the same position in the description of the levels of gov-
ernment.Whereas the provinces gradually and progressively became the auth-
ority with competences for governing functions over awide-area, metropolitan
cities served as a way of reinforcing the role of big cities in the light of social,
demographic and economic assumptions.
Unfortunately, the implementation of the constitutional reform of 2001
was hindered by the political stalemate that affected Italy during the period
2001–2013 (Caravita, 2013). Indeed, after the general elections of 2001 the
winning centre-right coalition decided to put obstacles in the way of the
process of implementation of the constitutional reform made in 2001. The
centre-right coalition boasted about devolution—like the mantra of the
Lega Nord—but practised centralization. Therefore, after a period of strong
momentum for local authorities and a dominant pro-decentralization
approach in the 1990s, a trend reversal (centralization) occurred 10 years later.
Even metropolitan cities suffered this stalling in the enactment of consti-
tutional reform. The government failed to activate the new entity, and metro-
politan cities remained only on paper.
An understanding of this drift towards recentralization it is not easy. Even
before the explosion of the economic crisis, the need to cut the budget hin-
dered every measure devoted to giving power and responsibility to provincial
and regional level as implied in the constitutional reformof 2001. Financial obli-
gations required by the Maastricht Treaty accentuated the state powers estab-
lished in the amended Articles 117 (on the distribution of legislative power to
state and regions), 118 (on the allocation of administrative functions) and 119
(on the financial autonomy of territorial authorities) of the Constitution.
Under the umbrella of austerity and the consequent resource cuts this
entailed, many other measures have affected local governments (Mangiameli,
2013). Themost stringent and pervasive reform has been that of Articles 81 (on
budget law), 97 (on administrative organization) and 119 of the Constitution
made by the constitutional Law No. 1 of 2012, which added that all local gov-
ernments are required to maintain a balanced budget (Fabbrini, 2013).
Interpreters have considered these acts as the most important example of
the reintroduction of the features of a centralized system. Through normative
acts, the state has constitutionally invaded the spaces of self-government
granted to local authorities and imposed more constraining non-negotiable
institutional arrangements on them (Groppi et al., 2013).
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4. Constitutional issues in the regulation of metropolitan cities
The Italian Constitution provides for the presence of an intermediate level of
government between regional and local authorities. The powers of intermedi-
ate government depend on both constitutional rules and legislation devel-
oped in the 1990s and 2000s (Vandelli, 2012). As territorial government
rests on constitutional foundations, the reform of intermediate authorities is
a tricky constitutional matter since it affects the strategies and equilibrium
of the whole structure of the Republic. Territorial government is not just the
lower level of the nation, but also a constitutive part of the constitutional
design.
Article 5 of the Constitution introduces the principle of both recognition
and promotion of local and intermediate government among the fundamen-
tal principles of the new constitutional order, and establishes respect for the
principle of decentralization on the part of the central state.
While the introduction in the Constitution in 2001 established the metro-
politan city, the devolution of powers to this new entity and the reform of
the provinces faced the resistance and inertia of the most involved subjects
—on one side, the regions, which considered these new territorial authorities
as a ‘dangerous competitor’ and, on the other, the neighbouring municipali-
ties, which feared the likely hegemony of the bigger city against them.
However, as mentioned above, when the economic crisis reached its peak,
and the entire Italian institutional set-up of local self-government was con-
sidered to be most responsible for the deficit, the reform of provinces could
no longer be delayed. On 6 December 2011 the government passed a first
decree-law to consolidate public finances as part of a plan to cut public spend-
ing by around €13 billion—including measures to “reduce the operating costs
of national authorities, the National Council for the Economy and Labour,
independent authorities and the provinces” (Article 23). The decree-law was
converted by parliament, but several regions challenged its provisions on
local government, alleging the violation of some articles of the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court struck down the rules on the provinces insofar as
the government had failed to comply with the constitutional requirement
of “extraordinary circumstances of necessity and urgency”, which are consti-
tutionally necessary when adopting decree-laws (decision No. 220 of 2013).
The government also approved several decree-laws to introduce metropolitan
cities (decree-laws Nos. 138 and 201 of 2011), but these attempts did not
achieve the objective; only the Delrio Act succeeded in realizing the
process of reorganization.
However, this gave rise to strong opposition to and criticism of, on one
side, the relationship between metropolitan cities and the upper levels of gov-
ernment and, on the other, between the metropolitan cities and municipali-
ties (Salerno and Fabrizzi, 2014). Commentators have considered the entire
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reform in breach of the Constitution since the transformation of intermediate
local government should have been enacted through a constitutional amend-
ment in order to be valid. Whereas, the government put the cart before the
horse, proposing the adoption of an act that anticipated a future consti-
tutional reform. The Italian parliament has approved a complex constitutional
reform, which will come into force if the Italian people vote in favour in next
autumn’s referendum. The constitutional reform aims to change Italian bica-
meralism and the relationship between the state and territorial authorities.
This reform pursues a simplification of the geography of territorial authorities
by removing references to provinces from the Constitution. If the proposal is
successful, the metropolitan city will remain the only wide-area authority
mentioned by the Constitution and so the only strong interlocutor with the
regions and municipalities. Other entities will follow a different destiny: pro-
vinces will only survive as ruled by the Delrio Act, without the recognition
of autonomy offered by the Constitution; municipalities will be entitled
merely to constitute unifications (unioni di comuni) in order to deal with
some mutual issues.
4.1. The relationship between metropolitan cities and upper levels of
government
The Delrio Act represented a real change with many implications for relation-
ships between both the state and regions with metropolitan cities. To appreci-
ate this point, it is necessary to go into greater depth in order to understand
the precise degree of autonomy wielded by metropolitan cities.
The increased power of metropolitan cities within the Delrio Act is clearly
the fruit of compromise. The distribution of powers has not been revolutio-
nized with respect to the provinces, although the reform has provided new
momentum to a flourishing of wide-area powers, giving the metropolitan
cities the aspect of paramount engines of local economic systems (30%
of the Italian population live in metropolitan cities, and they produce 35%
of the Italian GDP (OECD, 2013). However, like most of the reforms undertaken
in Europe in recent years, the Delrio Act was also implemented largely for
economic reasons. The decrease in human, financial and material resources
is the core of this statute and the main source of issues. For this reason, the
idea has been advanced that the newly established institution risks becoming
a weak rung on the ladder of multi-level governance because of the enforce-
ment of the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ at the local level, which every year sets
limits to financial balance items and controls local indebtedness (Vesperini,
2014).
In addition, the regions see metropolitan cities as having intruded between
their role and that of local authorities. In the regional context, metropolitan
cities constitute a problem since the new authority is ‘stronger’ than a
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province. Only 10 provinces were transformed into metropolitan cities and
although metropolitan cities and provinces share a similar structure of gov-
ernment—as noted above—they differ as regards competences: metropoli-
tan cities are stronger on the economic and demographic side. And this is
without considering that metropolitan cities will remain the only wide-area
authorities established directly in the Constitution if the ‘yes’ vote in the con-
stitutional referendum succeeds.
However, competition between regions and metropolitan cities is still in
progress, and is easily tangible in the current reshuffle of administrative com-
petences. The Delrio Act, in fact, assigns the duty to cooperate in the design of
a new distribution of those competences to national government and
regional executives. The regions have delayed this activity, eventually
holding back numerous functions, such as the environment, agriculture,
tourism, to which wide-area institutions would be entitled.
4.2. The relationship between metropolitan cities and municipalities
The analysis of the relationship between metropolitan cities and municipali-
ties offers a more comprehensive assessment of the role played by the inter-
mediate level within the multi-level government system designed by the
Italian Constitution. As for the relationships between provinces and municipa-
lities, these have tended to be continuing and dynamic, marked to some
extent by cooperation. But is it the same now in those areas where metropo-
litan cities have been established?
To answer this question, we first need to recall the differences of govern-
ance between new metropolitan cities and the ‘old’ provinces before the
Delrio Act reformed all of them and substituted the 10 most important with
metropolitan cities. The Delrio Act gives metropolitan cities not only impor-
tant competences for the governance of the wide-area, but also a lighter
legal and political status than the ‘old’ provinces. Indeed, before the Delrio
Act reformed their structures, the provinces were governed by three bodies:
the provincial council and the president, both directly elected by residents,
and the Giunta Provinciale, a kind of cabinet made up of a varying number
of officers known as assessori and chaired by the president. Comparisons
between metropolitan cities and ‘old’ provinces reveal that the former has
simpler government machinery and structure of government.
As things stand, we have to consider that the Delrio Act abolished ‘old’ pro-
vincial bodies, which were elected directly by residents, and replaced them
with the bodies of metropolitan cities, with new forms of institutional
representation.
In fact, the figure of the metropolitan mayor coincides with the mayor of
the biggest city in that territory and only mayors of each municipality and
municipal councillors are eligible to vote for metropolitan cities’ councillors
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(with the exception of the cities that opted for the direct election of mayor
and councillors by residents in their Charter of Autonomy). Thus, the reform
introduces assemblies (councils) representing not the local franchise but the
supra-communal interest of the municipalities included in the metropolitan
territory as the principal institutions of local self-government. This means
that members of metropolitan city councils represent their governing
boards of municipal institutions. The Delrio Act definitively sees metropolitan
bodies as a derivative of municipal self-government.
In accordance with the relationship with municipalities, metropolitan cities
can act either as political entities or as authorities at the service of municipa-
lities (a sort of ‘mentor’). They work to implement strategies and collaboration
among municipalities, and build public services at the infra-regional level (a
new institutional structure for both governing fragmented urban areas and
finding the right scale of government at the ‘meso’ level).
Each solution provides some risk because remaining a political entity, as
was the ‘old’ province, could lead to a return to the previous framework. At
the same time, the transformation in a smart and light wide-area institution
is likely to expose metropolitan cities to becoming a larger but less incisive
unification of municipalities.
This framework sparked a debate regarding the non-democratic character
of the metropolitan city, and there have been accusations of a betrayal of the
spirit of Italian decentralization, which is founded on the principle of represen-
tative democracy. The direct election of executives was considered an essen-
tial element of legitimacy for the local authority, whereas the picture that
emerges in the Act diverges from that of other local levels and from the
Italian tradition.
Even if much is delegated to the rules set out in the Charter of Autonomy,
the Delrio Act ultimately tends to consider the metropolitan city as an auth-
ority without political legitimacy, with functions of coordination and strategy
for the wide-area. This means that the metropolitan city does not act as the
direct administration working to achieve general objectives; it is essentially
a level of government that acts on the basis of strategic tasks. Thus, the repla-
cement of direct elections with automatic appointments and indirect elec-
tions brings about a gross transformation of intermediate local authorities
since metropolitan institutions are hardly accountable to the electorate.
Beyond the discourse over functions, the gap between the local electoral
space and the metropolitan policy area is likely to face increasing criticism.
Governance of metropolitan cities can result in a democratic dilemma
because system effectiveness secured through the involvement of municipa-
lities tends to bypass democracy in terms of citizen participation. In future,
metropolitan policies will gain visibility and importance, and so the
problem of distance from the citizen will increase. In parallel, mayors of
small municipalities belonging to a metropolitan city will have progressively
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more and more difficulty in basing their election campaigns on issues for
which their own responsibility is neither independent nor important. If such
a gap emerges, it will indicate that voting in the bigger city would be more
‘effective’ in comparison to voting for the other mayors and councils.
Finally, these trends will also affect the metropolitan city and its capacity to
cooperate with other levels and create functional networks to offer public ser-
vices and programme local transformation.
5. The role of metropolitan cities at EU level
As mentioned above when considering the evolution of metropolitan cities,
Italian governments since 2011 have put the reform of territorial authorities
at the top of their agenda. Transformations occurred in statehood as a conse-
quence of internal and external factors, such as the economic crisis, the devel-
opment of new technologies, the crisis in the welfare state and European
integration. However, it was still deemed necessary to establish metropolitan
authorities as a new form of wide-area governance in highly urbanized areas.
Thus, metropolitan cities are mostly the product of a top-down approach
characteristic of a new trend directed towards achieving efficient government
of localities as a consequence of the evolution driven by Europeanization. This
process has changed the intra-governmental dynamics in Italy, intensifying
the role of central government, which tends to occupy a stronger position
than regional and provincial governments (Swenden and Bolleyer, 2014).
These arguments should, however, be compared with the reality of the
influence of EU regulation on local authorities. The European dimension
affects the transition from traditional to new local government arrangements
and the change in the decision-making process of regional and local auth-
orities (Jones and Keating, 1995).
5.1. A new ‘form’ of local government
It is a certainty that the EU affects not only states but also territorial govern-
ment (Callanan, 2011). As the European integration process accelerated, sub-
national bodies became more and more involved in EU matters (Hooghe and
Marks, 2001). Two narratives can be used to summarize these developments.
First, the creation of a policy-making body, with consistent legal powers to
override decisions of nation-states, also has relevant implications for subna-
tional authorities. Second, subnational institutions affect the EU political
process through their everyday interactions with other levels of government,
their role as a conduit of information on EU affairs and their responsibility for
implementing EU policies. After the Single European Act in 1986 in particular,
many European legislations began to directly influence local and regional
governments (John, 1996).
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The EU has transformed politics and policies within member states, giving
itself powers in many areas formerly covered only by states, and it has created
a different background for the exercise of political power and authority.
Although it is difficult to completely map out the direction of change pro-
duced by European membership, and local authorities do not formally have
a voice at EU level, supranational changes have deeply affected local govern-
ment mostly through the influence on domestic politics (Keating, 2008;
Tatham, 2014; Keating et al., 2015). Three principles have particularly
marked these effects.
The first is the subsidiarity principle. This was introduced formally at the EU
level with the Maastricht Treaty, and thereby has penetrated into the juridical
order of member states, producing a revitalization of the constitutional pos-
ition of subnational government. The development of this principle has led
to the creation of the ‘Committee of the Regions and Local Authorities’.
After the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 this institution increased its authority and
gained more relevant powers which were not merely consultative and sym-
bolic (Tatham, 2014).
The second principle is that of pluralism. The EU has contributed not just
through institutional transformations. Rather, EU institutions and policies
transferred philosophies and working practices in a way that moved local
authorities away from hierarchical and old forms of administration towards
more negotiated and participated practices that blur the static view of admin-
istration and involve a wide range of interest groups (Goldsmith, 2002). Eur-
opeanization has produced an increase in pluralism and, in particular, the
emergence of a less institutionalized context: a pluralistic melting-pot of
public, private, voluntary and community organizations, rather than insti-
tution-based policy arenas (Bennington, 1994). Pluralism has affected rep-
resentation and participation at the local level, reinvigorating subnational
democracy (Schobben and Boschma, 2000).
The third principle influencing the role of subnational levels in the EU is
called multi-level governance. Together with subsidiarity, it has transformed
the way institutions cooperate and interact to constitute new forms of politics
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Swenden, 2006). Multi-level governance helped the
emergent role of local authorities and—in the last 10 years—the importance
of cities for the evolution of the economy at the European level.
5.2. The funding issue
Two of the main aspects of EU policies that now preoccupy local government
are the allocation of funds and respecting the Maastricht economic and finan-
cial parameters.
In the context of Italian decentralization, EU funding sustained the trans-
formation of the state during the 1990s. The amount of EU funds and the
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complexity of their management required the institutionalization of direct
links between institutions of local authorities and those of the EU. This
article will not delve into the story of EU cohesion policies and the use of struc-
tural funds. However, since the 1980s EU institutions have increasingly spent
considerable financial resources on the development of regions and local ter-
ritories (Hooghe and Keating, 1994). Eligible subnational actors have derived
considerable benefit from access to these sources of funding (financial mobil-
ization), allowing them to pursue projects or develop cross-national agree-
ments—albeit always with the leading support of the relevant central
governments (Goldsmith, 2002; Bache and Bristow, 2003).
However, the EU is not always good as an investor. The main goal of the
austerity measures decided upon in Italy during the last eight years was to
comply with EU economic governance agreements and, consequently, to
prevent the collapse of Italian public finances. Indeed, in the last 20 years
almost every authority in the member states has discovered the ‘oppressive’
nature of European restrictions on debt, such as the ‘Stability Pact’. Over the
last five years, under the umbrella of ‘stability’, several innovations have been
introduced for local government; in addition, the reform of the intermediate
level, discussed here, has mainly been a product of these measures (Bolgher-
ini, 2014).
6. The Delrio Act before the Italian Constitutional Court
As mentioned above, the Italian Constitutional Court has played an important
role in moulding decentralization in Italy. In the light of the problems outlined,
it is evident that the laws and the process of their implementation are only
one part of the way localism is shaped. In this context, one addition is the
role of the courts in which Italy is not exceptional. In other legal systems, judi-
cial review also plays an important role since courts can rule on fundamental
questions regarding local government (Alder, 2001).
In the recent Italian experience, constitutional judgements have regularly
shaped the interpretation of constitutional reforms. Since 2001 the Court
has repeatedly justified expanding role of central government at the cost of
regions. Furthermore, local authorities have been considered in several judge-
ments, although they cannot be part of litigations before the Italian Consti-
tutional Court since direct access is limited only to the state and regions.
Thus, the involvement of local government has been conducted through
the voice of the upper level authorities, as in the case decided by the Court
in March 2015 about the constitutional status of metropolitan cities (decision
No. 50 of 2015).
The Court was faced with a case of alleged unconstitutionality of several
provisions of the Delrio Act. Four regions (Lombardy, Veneto, Campania and
Apulia) challenged 58 different paragraphs of the Delrio Act before the
REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES 523
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
 St
ud
i d
i B
olo
gn
a] 
at 
13
:16
 23
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
Italian Constitutional Court as they were allegedly interfering with regional
competences and were therefore violating the constitutional framework;
this was with regard to Articles 1 (on popular sovereignty), 5 (on the principles
of the Republic’s unity and decentralization), 48 (on the right to vote), 114 (on
authorities forming the Republic), 117 (on the distribution of legislative power
to state and regions) and 133 (on modification of local boundaries) of the Con-
stitution and Article 9 of the European Charter of Local Self-Government. The
regions challenged almost every paragraph of the Delrio Act on metropolitan
cities and, in particular, those parts relating to the institution and the replace-
ment of the provinces, the metropolitan mayors, councils and committees.
The regions asserted that the Delrio Act tended to bend the meaning of
the Constitution, shifting the balance of power between state and regional
level.
The reasoning of the regions could be regarded as implying three different
arguments on this problem.
First, they challenged the state legislative competence used to rule on the
institution of metropolitan cities. The regions claimed that the law violated
Article 117 of the Constitution since it was not concerned with any of the sub-
jects of exclusive legislative competence reserved to the national
government.
Second, even though the state has not modified the boundaries of pro-
vinces by replacing the latter with metropolitan cities, the Delrio Act violated
the constitutional provisions on the modification of boundaries of local
authorities.
Third, the regions challenged the democratic deficit which the provisions
on metropolitan cities produced on local self-government. By also giving
the office of metropolitan mayor to the mayor of the biggest city, and the enti-
tlement to become members of the metropolitan committee only to the
mayors, the Delrio Act is deemed in contrast with the tenets of local self-gov-
ernment, subsidiarity, democracy, as well as decentralization.
The Italian Constitutional Court rejected the arguments of the petitioners
and ruled that the national legislature has the power to freely institute and
regulate metropolitan cities. Thus, the Delrio Act does not infringe any of
those constitutional principles which the regions claimed had been
encroached.
Despite the importance of every passage of this decision, only some
aspects of it are worth commenting upon. It is therefore necessary to fully
understand them prior to considering that access to the Italian Constitutional
Court is rather circumscribed. Italian constitutional adjudication differs sub-
stantially from Anglo-Saxon judicial review of legislation (Barsotti et al.,
2015). First, the Italian Constitutional Court is a constitutionally established,
independent branch of the central state whose main purpose is to defend
the normative superiority of the Constitution within the juridical order. The
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framers of the Constitution established a ‘centralized’ model of review similar
to that introduced in other countries of Continental Europe (Stone Sweet,
2012). Second, there are few avenues to access the Italian Constitutional
Court. One is that of Article 127 of the Constitution through which both the
national and regional governments may challenge, respectively, a regional
or a national law within 60 days of its publication (Groppi, 2008). This, the
so-called ‘direct review’, is the only tool for guaranteeing the constitutional
separation of legislative competences between the national and regional gov-
ernments (Arban, 2015).
The Italian Constitutional Court’s ruling in the Delrio Act case is made up of
two specific arguments.
Firstly, the Court assumes the regulation of metropolitan cities as an area
where the state is free to make laws in order to determine the basic organ-
ization, powers and functions of these local authorities. In contrast, regions
have no right to regulate this matter since they lack the competence to
reform local autonomy. Against this background, the state acted under
the provision of the separation of legislative powers set out in Article
117 of the Constitution. In this view, the Italian Constitutional Court neg-
lected the thesis of the region whereby they assumed to have the compe-
tence to regulate even ‘the institution of metropolitan cities’. Commentators
found a clear-cut example of a changing attitude of the Italian Consti-
tutional Court towards regionalism in this line of reasoning and, in particu-
lar, towards the regions’ demands to regulate matters outside their
legislative competences. Indeed, this judgement represents a good
example of the Italian Constitutional Court’s shift from regionally to cen-
trally oriented decisions issued during a time of economic crisis (Groppi
et al., 2013).
Secondly, the Court considers it necessary to endorse state efforts to
reform local authorities, and, in particular, the introduction of metropolitan
cities. The argument of the Italian Constitutional Court delves into the
reason behind the reform of second-tier of local authorities that has been
highlighted in this passage of the judgement: ‘With this law’ the Court affirms
the legislature intended to make a significant and systematic reform of all public
authorities forming the Republic (Article 114 of the Constitution) in order to sim-
plify the characters of local government, without arriving at the abolition of
those established in the Constitution (cfr. § 3.4.2 of the Conclusions on points
of law).
The Italian Constitutional Court then alluded to two overlapping aspects of this
law that we have already highlighted: (1) this law only anticipates a broad, forth-
coming constitutional reform of those provisions governing local entities; (2)
the complex nature of the provisions of the Delrio Act is excusable because it
is the outcome of long and difficult political bargaining.
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In this sense the argumentation of the Court reveals a hidden intent to ease
both the transition from a more centrifugal to a more centripetal division
of powers between the state and the regions, and the achievement of an
independent constitutional role for metropolitan cities—with minimum
interference from the regions. In addition, the Court remembers the pillars
of this independence: European relevance, fiscal autonomy and power of
self-regulation (with regard to both functions and basic organization).
Based on this reasoning, the Court declines those issues on the boundaries
and the structure of local government (mayor, council and committee). State
power to regulate metropolitan cities even overrides the international cove-
nants that Italy has signed. Surprisingly, the Italian Constitutional Court
invokes the lack of effectiveness of the European Charter of Local Self-Govern-
ment in Italy in order to exclude both the infringement of this Charter and the
necessity for the direct election of metropolitan city members. For the Italian
Constitutional Court, the expression ‘freely elected’ in Article 3 of the Charter
does not mean ‘directly elected’ since it asks only for the respect of democracy
and representativeness in the choosing of local members.
Although a strict interpretation of the ruling leads to the consideration of
the result of this decision as relevant only for determining the competence to
regulate metropolitan cities, this judgement marks the end of the strong
version of the regional state in Italy. To some extent, this would be an
attack on the 2001 reform and the difficult implementation of subsidiarity,
differentiation and suitability set forth in Article 118 of the Constitution. We
must admit that the reasoning and wording of this judgement could very
well lead to this type of broad interpretation. The Court states in very
general terms that the regulation of local authorities must be uniform for
every city, no matter what its size, population, territory, etc. However, state
law has not covered everything. The Delrio Act allows the Charter of Auton-
omy of each metropolitan city to make some choice in order to adapt the
regulation to its specific conditions. Evidently, this ‘margin of discretion’ has
been considered determinative for upholding the law.
7. Perspectives
In this article, we have argued that the new Italian legislation on metropolitan
cities generates a new state-centric dynamic for Italian regionalism. The Delrio
Act relies on an ostensibly attractive yet deeply political logic of ‘centralism’,
which endorses the superior decision-making capacity of central state over
local communities.
The reform introduced by the Delrio Act is wide-ranging and significant,
although its precise implementation as yet remains somewhat uncertain. As
this article has identified, however, the Delrio Act is only the first part of an
overarching constitutional reform that the parliament passed in April 2016
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and that will be the object of a constitutional referendum in October 2016.
Thus while the law has consistency by itself, the new constitutional rules on
local and regional powers are necessary for the complete and correct
implementation of the Delrio Act. Indeed, the success of the reform rests
on the combination of the bottom-up/voluntary (on the side of the relation-
ship between metropolitan cities and municipalities) and top-down (on the
side of the relationship between metropolitan cities and upper levels of gov-
ernment) implementation of the Delrio Act. So, the institutional role of metro-
politan cities depends both on the powers they exercise and on the
boundaries they have in the exercise of these powers. Although the legislative
power is vested in the state and regional levels, implementation has to be
pursued primarily at the local level (Mehde, 2006). The dawn of metropolitan
cities is clearly an example of a state-centric approach in the reform of inter-
mediate levels of government. However, the success or failure of the reform
lies in the effort and the struggle of all territorial authorities and, particularly,
in the capacity of lower levels to contribute to the enactment of new
regulation.
This clearlymakes a strong argument for government to give local authorities
the possibility of becoming an ‘experimental laboratory’ for good practice, by
changing their approach, for example, to public administration, delivering ser-
vices at a lower cost, cutting red tape, simplifying the organization, etc. Such
an incentive would be in accordance with the request for innovation and
reduction of public expenditure that affects all European member states.
Metropolitan cities, therefore, have the opportunity of playing a central role
in good governance and collaboration, by creating new networks at the inter-
municipal, national and European levels, integrating metropolitan functions
(with the dispositions of the Charter of Autonomy) and adopting a three-
year strategic plan. These developments, indeed, involve more complex
systems of actors, and different forms of action, based on flexibility, partner-
ship, voluntary participation and, to some extent, competition. Such activity
currently lacks the institutional consolidation necessary for the construction
of a wide-area steering capacity. Thus, state, regions and the same metropo-
litan cities need to work together in order to foster the creation of an insti-
tutional architecture of cooperation-collaboration (Loughlin, 2013).
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